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Artification in Natural History Museums
  Kaisa Mäki-Petäjä 
Abstract
Natural history exhibitions have changed considerably over recent decades
concurring with a rise of a general movement of aestheticization in the
Western culture.  This usually results from an attempt to make the
exhibitions more appealing to provide the public numerous ways of
enjoying themselves, but they are also used to communicate information,
especially of an ethical and affective kind.
In this paper I will consider the effects of a particular kind of
aestheticization, namely artification, of these kinds of exhibitions.
Artification, i.e., the process of regarding non-art objects as art, appears
to be in conflict with the science-based purposes of these exhibitions.  Is
this truly so?  Does science and the viewer’s understanding of scientific
knowledge change when science is presented and experienced as art or as
art-like or as something aesthetic?  I will approach this question
phenomenologically by pondering my own experience in the Natural
History Museum in Helsinki and the relation of aesthetics, science and art
on that basis.  Instead of trying to define how art-like the exhibit in
question as a whole is, I will concentrate on certain characters the exhibit
has that are perhaps more readily associated with artistic:  uniqueness
and presence, and how through these concepts we may gain a look into
the interrelation between art and science.
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1. Introduction
Natural history and science are not generally seen as having much to do
with the aesthetic or art.  However, if aestheticization is nevertheless
present in a non-art museum, such as a natural history museum, are
there also instances where non-art gets presented and viewed as if it were
art?  In other words, is there artification in natural history museums?  How
does that happen?  Does it happen unintentionally?  Perhaps more
importantly, what happens when one experiences non-art as art?  When
being experienced and approached as art, how does this change the
visitor’s comprehension of that non-art object?  Specifically, do science
and viewers’ understanding of scientific knowledge change when it is
presented and experienced as art or as art-like or as something aesthetic?
I do not claim to be able to answer these questions conclusively for their
heavy dependence on the individual visitor present in the situation and the
particulars of that situation (e.g. the subject matter, the manner of the
display, the company present).  In order to unlock the conundrum, it is
necessary to try to unravel the experience a visitor has upon encountering
an exhibit of this kind.  A section of the Marine Biodiversity exhibit in the
Natural History Museum in Helsinki, or The Wall of Sea Life (hereafter
referred as The Wall) offered me such an opportunity.  In this paper I will
explore artification phenomenologically by analyzing a visitor’s experience,
in this occasion my own, as I do not have records of any other
encounters.  
I should point out that the objective here is to theorize on the possible
ramifications of artifying a natural history exhibit.  Also I feel reasonably
safe to assume that my train of thought, in particular the confusion I felt
when I first encountered The Wall, is familiar to other visitors as well.  I
had entered the exhibit with the full awareness of the context of natural
history as the premise of my experience.  Most likely as other visitors had,
I set out to interpret whatever I might encounter according to the
paradigm of natural history exhibitions by focusing on active interpretation
and information-gathering.  Artification of an exhibit would instead
advocate an aesthetic approach, a mode emphasizing the immediate
sensory experience and engagement where the presence of the object is
material, a mode familiar to art museum exhibitions.
2. The exhibit and the experience
The Marine Biodiversity exhibit (illus. 1) is the opening room of a larger
diorama form of exhibition called the Wildlife of the World.  Its space is
fairly long, high and narrow, so it is rather difficult to view the whole of
the exhibit at once.  This gives the Marine Biodiversity exhibit an
impression of an installation, as a visitor is compelled to share the space
with the exhibit in order to make sense of it.  Here the exhibit already
utilizes a method common to certain art works.  For instance, some public
sculptures require and encourage the active bodily participation of the
viewers without which the art work does not fully manifest itself.
The right-hand-side of the exhibit is strikingly plain, with an unassuming
map of the world, a few lines of light-colored writing, and two stuffed fish
and a porpoise placed high above the map.  The arrangement is so modest
that I needed to check the photographs I had taken on a previous visit to
see if my recollection of the stuffed creatures was accurate.  On the left-
hand side is The Wall, with its surface painted dark and filled with a
multitude of sea creatures on clear plexiglass shelves:  seashells, coral,
fish, all kinds of dry and wet specimens from floor to ceiling – a swarm of
creatures that is almost overwhelming.  They are all lit by a mysterious
light that seems to come from nowhere in particular yet leaves every
specimen lighted for the viewer’s convenience.  From the ceiling hangs a
further set of stuffed sea creatures, while at the end of the hallway is a
habitat diorama with a polar bear reaching deep through a hole in the ice
to grab an escaping seal, a very dramatic and life-like arrangement.
When I first saw this exhibit I practically dismissed all other parts except
The Wall.  I glanced at the map, noted that there is stuff hanging from the
ceiling, and was sucked in the moment I saw The Wall.  It was as if the
multitude of creatures had surged to meet me.  I almost immediately
began to pay attention and study the individual specimens’ contours,
colors, and their very materiality.  Other specimens formed arrangements
that emerged as objects of interest, as aesthetic compositions, or even still
lifes, and it was these sea shell arrangements that thrust me out of the
aesthetic bliss I had sunk into.  I became aware that even if all the
creatures on the wall have an air of being thoughtfully organized, the plan
is not clear.  I suddenly expected there to be a scientific reason behind it. 
There are the mollusks and the starfish ordered nicely together, but why
are they placed as they are?  Is it according to the class or phylum?  Is
the order of placing within a group relevant at all?  I had begun with the
presumption that I was examining a scientific exhibit, but something
seemed to be amiss.  The Wall was oddly mute.  It looked like an old-
fashioned natural history exhibit and yet was not.  Instead of scientific
information, it offered me something much more ephemeral.
Despite my presumption, I had begun to examine The Wall with an
aesthetic view, and the confusion had arisen when I changed my approach
from aesthetic to scientific.  As quickly as I dismissed the right-hand wall,
I had engaged[1] with the left-hand one.  That engagement was decidedly
aesthetic in a sensuous, formalistic sense, at least at first.  I was drawn to
study the contours, colors, and arrangement of the specimens in a
particularly appreciative manner essential to aesthetic appreciation.  I
focused on each specimen as an individual, beautiful (or terrifying) and
worthy of appreciation in itself.  I did not examine every specimen present
but with a quick glance selected those that caught my eye by their
appearance before turning to see the whole.  But as I turned to take in
that bigger picture, I did not tune in to see the whole Wall as an art work,
as I asked, “So what is this all about?”  What I meant was, “What’s the
science in this?”
Especially in museums of cultural history, it is common today to find works
of art that do not belong to the actual collections but yet are an active part
of the exhibitions as an independent commentary.[2]  Therefore, perhaps
it should not be so surprising to encounter a work of art in a natural
history museum, but yet, should The Wall be interpreted and approached
as art?  The works of art in cultural history exhibitions are quite clearly
presented as independent objects of art, though reasons concerning
copyright and artist’s intellectual ownership may play some part in this,
but this is not the case with The Wall.  It is not readily identified as a work
of art by the museum but is presented within the context of natural history
museum.  Yet I approached it as if it was art, often held to be the opposite
and even antithetical to science.
Therefore, it is not an insignificant choice that a visitor encounters here,
for both choices, whether to see it as a piece of art or as science, may
transform not only the visitor’s point of view but also the meaning of the
actual contents of the display.  By now museum visitors in general have
grown rather accustomed to increasingly elaborate exhibitions, and it is no
longer surprising in itself that aestheticization has reached natural history
museums and has become a regular part of the museum experience, but
The Wall takes one step further.  Depending on one’s views, it is not
simply fancy or an engaging way of teaching science to enthusiastic
visitors, but something containing art-like qualities both in presentation
and in interpretation.  I will return to this issue later on.
3. Aesthetics, natural history and science
Aesthetics in one form or another has always been a part of natural
philosophy and its descendant, the life sciences, but, as Wolfgang Welsch
claims, aesthetics is an ambiguous word referring sometimes to sensuous
perception, sometimes to art perception, the fictional or poetic, for
example.[3]  First, as Neil Campbell proclaims in his textbook, Biology,
“[b]iology is a visual science, and many of our students are visual
learners.”[4]  Biology, medicine, botany, microbiology, etc. and their
progenitor, natural philosophy, are profoundly descriptive exercises and
their subject matter is uniquely visual, as Stephen T. Asma notes.[5]  They
all began as a study of forms of life and though the Enlightenment placed
imagery as secondary to text and mathematics, images and other forms of
visual data and the act of looking have remained at the core of the life
sciences.  Modern medical diagnostic processes, for example, are not only
visual but rely considerably on aesthetic perception as a means of
collecting information on the situation.  This, of course, is aesthetics in the
meaning given in contemporary aesthetics as relating to perception
through senses, but it does also include the act of analyzing by
distinguishing patterns and sequences in that sensory information.
Second, it is precisely this analysis by sequencing and searching for
emerging patterns that is at the heart of the birth of science. Though the
collection of wondrous objects began long before, the purpose of the
original natural history collections was to create a complete Chain of
Being, with all its constituent species in their proper order.[6]  This was
thought to be an essentially uncomplicated structure of ascension, from
the most primitive species to the most, not evolved as we are now
tempted to say, but complex or sophisticated ones.[7]  The natural order
was perceived as a rather straightforward case of finding the correct
sequence of placement for the species.[8]  The correct order was
determined by a meticulous study of the physical appearance and
composition of the species, for example, the shape and structure of its
reproductive organs.  
The first practices of systemized genealogies were predominantly
aesthetic, as they were based on the physical appearance of species,
discounting physical functions and other underlying differentiating
features.  Unlike the early physicists who relied on measurable and
quantifiable primary properties of the objects of their study (e.g. motion
and numbers), natural historians based their studies mostly on non-
quantifiable secondary properties (e.g. color and sound), a fact which
Eugene Hargrove sees as a link between natural history science and arts,
which are also grounded on secondary properties.[9]  According to Asma,
this “emphasis on the phenomena, the appearances of things, was very
disturbing to many naturalists of the period because they were afraid that
one could not construct a proper science on something so fickle and
fluctuating as the senses.”[10]  This fear rose partly from a belief that
there must be exception-less, universal truths underlying the natural
world.
Third, sharing a past with the constructiveness of the act of arranging,
Wolfgang Welsch states that there is now an increasingly shared view
among philosophers of science that science and scientific endeavors are
fundamentally aesthetic, as the constitution of reality itself is
aesthetic.[11]  Welsch calls this epistemological aestheticization and sees
it rising from thinking of a Nietzschean origin that our cognition is
aesthetic, since we produce reality with fictional means to match the
comprehension that all things are in reality floating, unstable and
insecure.[12]  Therefore, scientific thinking and the theories it produces
are also floating and elastic in order to match and to survive the
fluctuations of reality.
Yet another way in which aesthetics is present in the sciences comes from
the fact that scientific knowledge, which is generally abstract and
conceptual, often needs to be visualized for the sake of fluent and effective
communication.  This visualization includes both the formation of a mental
picture and rendering something visible.  Sometimes these visualizations
are symbolic or analogical like the visual presentations of atoms, which,
while being perfectly functional visual models, are only that and do not
represent the actuality (in this case partly because it was developed before
there were means for actually seeing an atom).  These kinds of visual
means are an irreplaceable part of scientific representations.
Exhibitions, collections, and especially the ordering of a collection are a
part of this visualizing process.  The basic purpose of any natural history
exhibition or collection is to visualize both the organization of the natural
world and the laws and structures that, according to prevalent scientific
theory and knowledge, govern and describe the actuality of the natural
world.  Today the components of this actuality most often addressed are
evolution, biodiversity, and ecology, and in the original natural history
collections the goal was to create a complete Chain of Being, as I
mentioned earlier.
These states of aesthetics and aestheticization lie within the character of
science, but there is another form of aestheticization present in
contemporary scientific exhibitions.  In Undoing Aesthetics, Welsch writes
about the “aesthetic furnishment of reality” by which he means “furnishing
reality with aesthetic elements, sugar-coating the real with aesthetic
flair.”[13]  He recognizes these acts of embellishing and enhancing as
attributes of a world that “is becoming a domain of experience.”[14] 
While this trend is obvious in the world in general, it certainly is present in
the museum world, where ‘experience’ as a concept is, for all practical
purposes, taken for granted.  
A visit to a museum is perceived as a “museum experience” and is
strongly and actively associated with presumably positive characteristics
that are rewarding not only intellectually but, more importantly,
emotionally, by being inspirational, moving, touching, and meaningful on a
personal level, by being physically and mentally comfortable and pleasing,
and by being able to transcend everyday experiences.  These aspects of an
experience work on an immediate, sensuous level of experience and rely
on the presence of objects in a way that is rather similar to art museums. 
While the concept of museum experience is partly a result of
epistemological aestheticization and particularly of the changes in our
understanding of learning processes, it is expressed most visibly as
aestheticization in the appearances of exhibitions.
4. The Wall of Sea Life as a visualization of science
If The Wall is a scientific visualization, shouldn’t it present its information
through scientific principles of representation?  The overall visual
characteristics of the display tend to encourage this interpretation.  Objects
on display are biological specimens that are preserved according to
scientific standards, using both wet and dry methods.  As individual
objects they represent a variety of species and are grouped according to
their closest taxonomic groups, from what I can tell, by genus and family. 
The design of the display is clearly traditional for natural history museum
displays, as it advocates a distinct organization of the natural world.
Though the general design appears to be scientific, there are some
characteristics of a scientific representation that are missing.  The
positioning of the taxonomic groups in relation to each other is somewhat
unclear.  This arises from a lack of clear, even strict visual rhythm typical
of taxonomic displays of this kind.  Tradition leads us to expect a
measured and logically evident and predictable organization of specimens
by the transformation of a visually observable trait among specimens, e.g.
the number of tendrils.  Traditionally, one expects the arrangement of
specimens to follow a clear geometric plan of rows, columns or circles
within which variation would become visible.  In this display this geometric
rhythm is either missing or is rather loose in comparison to other displays
of this kind.  For example, the shellfish, which show a great variation of
color and a gradual transformation of form, if grouped geometrically, are
here presented in a free-form fashion (Illus. 2).
As a traditional-style display, the Wall would be expected to promote the
conventions of natural philosophical thinking:  ascension, universality, and
the orderliness of the natural world.  Also, we would expect that these
conventions could be deduced to a certain degree from the visual
appearance of the display, particularly through the geometric positioning of
the specimens, which not only visualizes the taxonomic relationships but
also connotes these conventions.  Certainly, traditional displays and
exhibitions are not necessarily clear-cut in this respect, but it must be
remembered that they were not meant for the view of the general public
but for the professional community, which had the knowledge to interpret
its logic.  Here, however, the audience consists mainly of the general
public, and the objective of the contemporary museum is to share
information that the average visitor does not readily possess.  From this
perspective, the information is not deducible from the display’s visual
appearance without the presence of interpretive labels, and though a label
naming the specimens and the taxonomic groups is present, its placement
at the periphery of the space does not support smooth communication,
even if it is noticed by visitors.  I did not notice a single visitor utilizing the
labels methodically, though my observations are based on a rather small
group of visitors.  It appears unlikely that the information that the labels
have to offer was communicated.
If we hold that a display visualizing science should share at least some
principles of scientific practice, then the Wall should be clear in its meaning
and logic.  The scientific principles and theories within it should be
reasonably obtainable and presented in a fashion that does its best to
avoid misunderstandings.  The visitor should have a clear, even if not
necessarily complete, picture of what is being presented. 
Held against this background, it does not seem appropriate to view the
Wall as a natural history or science display.  There is too much ambiguity
inherent in it; its muteness is disorienting.  It raises a heap of questions,
which could be seen as something positive as leading the visitor to seek
engagement, but this is too easily undone by the Wall’s unwillingness to
provide answers.  I tried to find something that would explain the intention
behind the display in order dispel the possibility of a misinterpretation on
my part, but the only public mention that I could find was on the
museum’s Finnish website stating, “Upon entering the exhibition a
monumental wall of wondrous life-forms from seas around the world opens
before the visitor.  Both colorful corals and peculiar looking fish can be
found on the wall.”[15]  This descriptive text says nothing about the
science but seems, in its wording, to connote a more aesthetic objective. 
5.  Could it be art?
What if we, the visitors, do not meet the Wall as science but pick up on the
aesthetic clues and try to approach it as an object for aesthetic
appreciation in a manner corresponding to the act of approaching art? 
Whether this happens on a regular basis in the exhibition is unclear
because of the lack of empirical study but, again, if artistic means, such as
a specific layout and lighting,[16] are intentionally used in the exhibit to
induce affective learning, what happens when something that is not art
becomes experienced as art-like?  If this happens, then the conventions of
thinking of art and science as contradictory could be mistaken. 
I feel uncomfortable or at least hesitant to state that the Wall is art or
even art-like.  This calls for a definition of art.  What criteria should I use? 
What definitions would render it art?  Dennis Dutton argued in The Art
Instinct that it is not fruitful for aesthetics to try to define art by studying
borderline cases, where definitions get stretched and become disputable,
but that instead the arguments should first be formed on clear cases.[17] 
For the same reasons, I believe the contrary to be also true, that it is not
necessarily worthwhile to try to determine if borderline cases are art.  
At this point I am unable to determine positively whether the Wall is art,
art-like, or not art at all.  Instead, I will work from the premise that the
Wall has some shared features with objects of art and that there is a
connection through family resemblance.  Welsch referred to this
Wittgensteinian idea in order to settle aesthetic’s semantic ambiguity
without mentioning art in the context,[18] but Dutton presented a set of
cluster criteria for art as a starting point for his efforts in describing an art
instinct, and it becomes apparent that his aim is to resolve a similar
semantic ambiguity concerning the concept of art.[19]  Therefore, when
using the concept “art-like,” I do not intend to claim that the Wall is like
art in the literal sense but that it has some shared aspects with objects of
art and their aesthetic appreciation.  These shared aspects are numerous,
but there are two distinct ones, uniqueness and presence, that may help to
discover the ramifications of artification of the Wall because they appear to
conflict with the pertinent scientific notions.[20]
6.  Uniqueness and individuals
One thing that differs significantly between aesthetic and scientific objects
is the notion and claim that works of art or aesthetic objects in general are
unique, that they are characterized by concepts like uniqueness,
individuality, and autonomy.  As Dutton pointed out, “The arts are about
particularity,”[21] while science deals with generalizations.  What is
relevant here is that we, in our ordinary, everyday parlance, are taught to
appreciate objects of art as unique entities that need not be anything else
than what they in themselves already are.  As Roger Scruton described it,
we enter a state of mind which we refer to as aesthetic appreciation and in
which we appreciate objects for their uniqueness.  When regarded in this
way, an object is, in that instance, no longer replaceable by another.[22] 
Another quite like it will not do just as well.  When we regard something as
an aesthetic object, it can thus be said that we regard it as being
individuated.
It is remarkably easy to detach one specific specimen from the rest of the
Wall and appreciate it first and foremost aesthetically.  A particularly good
example is two jars, the first holding one and the second two tiny young
sea turtles.  (See Illus 3.)  The juvenile turtles are, like all reptilian
offspring, tiny copies of their adult forms, if only “cuter” by proportions.  I
found it very difficult not to let them affect me by trying hard to see them
exclusively as specimens and not as tiny, dead babies, but it was to no
avail.  It was especially moving and engaging to view the two turtles
embracing in the pale liquid of the container, glowing in a warm light that
was like a gentle searchlight emanating from beneath and framing them
against the dark background, as if to suspend them in the ocean depths
where, by rights, they should be.  In my eyes, by my sentiments, they
became individuals, sadly dead, which no specimen in a natural history
collection should ever be.  It became impossible for me to see those two
jars as specimens.  I could no longer study their features and see them as
examples featuring the shared attributes of all sea turtles.  For me, those
features were now faces.
While aesthetic objects can very well be regarded as individuals, scientific
specimens are not as a rule perceived as individuals, unique, or
autonomous.  They are illustrative representatives of their species or kind. 
They never stand alone, not even when they have something singularly
distinctive to them.  Uniqueness on an individual level is problematic
especially in life sciences.  A singular observation of a kind is not assumed
as unique but as a first occurrence.  If an animal unknown to science is
found, it is not referred to as a unique animal but as a member of a
previously unknown species.  A singular white dove in a flock is not unique
but rather a variation.  To encapsulate, it could be said that, in science,
“unique” translates as “the first observed incident,” “one of its kind so far,”
or “rare.” It might be special or unusual but  only  in regard to the whole,
and it is seldom, if ever, autonomous.
While it is perfectly acceptable to view an individual painting in an art
museum separately from the rest of the art works and its art historical
background, treating specimens in a natural history exhibition similarly
would be misleading.  There, individual specimens always denote
something else and exist within a context; if this connection is ignored, the
information contained in the act of displaying becomes obscured.  The act
of disregarding the context renders the specimen mute.  While it can be
argued that appreciating a work of art is appreciating it without any use
for it in mind, the premise of a natural history exhibition is that all acts of
displaying, including the artistic or aesthetic ones, are used as a means for
something else.  Objects almost always represent a concept or natural
laws.[23]  Therefore, if I choose to adopt a somewhat disinterested
aesthetic appreciation as my mode of engagement in a natural history
museum, I end up undermining some of the didactic goals and
opportunities of discovering resemblances and relationship. I turn off its
voice, so to speak.
But by presenting a specimen primarily as an individual and not as a
representative of its species, an exhibition can guide its visitors’ attention
to reach beyond what is present to study the bigger picture.  In Stuffed
Animals and Pickled Heads, Stephen T. Asma related the story of the Field
Museum’s “jewel” Sue, the biggest and the most complete fossilized
skeleton of a Tyrannosaurus rex ever discovered.
...  Sue represents the best and the worst of edutainment.  Sue is the very
embodiment of good museum drama.  She is ancient in the way that gives
visitors a brush with human fragility and infinitude.  She is dangerous and
imposing (...) in the way that simultaneously repels and attracts visitors. 
She’s rare and strange, and she kindles a bonfire of imagination and
research.  Her bones tell many tales that researchers and visitors will be
trying to decode for years to come.  For example, the fact that she broke
her leg (usually instant death for a predator) and that it was partially
healed suggest that T. rex may have had continuous mates (a male that
brought food, in this case.)  Sue will be a prism for many such issues of
ethology, physiology, morphology, and so on.  Besides all that, she’s just
plain cool.[24]
As a dramatic figure, Sue is something with which visitors can identify,
something that ignites imagination to conjure up scenes of the Jurassic
era, with Sue alive and active.  A name animates Sue.  Having a name
connotes a personal history, with additional help from interpretive texts,
appropriate scenery, and so on.  Sue expands to be more than just a
specimen but a manifestation or embodiment of the whole concept of the
Jurassic era, thus moving the exhibit closer to an artified exhibit.
7.  Presence
There is more to individuality than just names.  In “The Power of
Presence:  the ‘Cradle to Grave’ Installation at the British Museum,”[25]
Camilla Mordhorst analyzed and described an exhibit quite similar to the
Wall, with the exception that the “Cradle to Grave” is an established art
work by the artist group Pharmacopoeia, an installation that is a part of a
popular, award-winning exhibition, the British Museum’s Living and Dying
gallery.[26]  Mordhorst’s article includes a detailed description of the
installation but it is sufficient for my purpose here to say that “Cradle to
Grave” is a 13-meter-long, low glass case containing two lengths of fabric,
one representing the life of an unknown woman, the other a man’s.  On
each fabric, over 14,000 tablets, pills, capsules, and so on are arranged
chronologically to represent the medication an average British citizen takes
over her or his lifetime.  Various ordinary objects, from photographs to
condoms, all kinds of intimate things, lie along the lengths of fabric. 
Handwritten captions provide explanations for each particular photograph: 
“Dec. 99.  Terry’s beards trim by Rosie – probably 4 weeks from death
from cancer at this point.”[27]  All this is surrounded by the rest of the
exhibition, objects and artifacts of life and death from all around the world
in airy glass-and-steel vitrines. 
Despite the fact that one is recognized as a work of art and the other is
not, the Cradle and the Wall have much in common.  They both rely on the
act of laying out a representative part of the components of a complex
system (medical life history, biodiversity of oceans).  Both display a visual
organization that represents or visualizes something non-visual (passage
of life/time, taxonomy of oceanic species/ecosystem).  Both have adopted
a visual style that bears resemblance to how objects of scientific interests
are often displayed.  Though both include scientific information as texts
(names of the medicines/species), they have an air of silence or muteness
about them.  And finally, judging from the visitors’ reactions,  both are
engaging and well-liked.
Mordhorst proposed that the success of the exhibit and the installation can
be explained through “presence,” a concept she drew from literary theorist
Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht.  According to Mordhorst, the installation allows a
visitor to perceive the course of life as an extension in space instead of the
more conventional understanding of life as an extension of time, where
“[t]he abstract ordering of the life course in time is replaced with a
concrete physical length of a fabric in a room.”[28]  This happens,
according to Mordhurst, because the installation makes a visitor “enter”
the life course when he or she walks along the lengths of fabric at his or
her own pace and choosing.[29]  One no longer looks into the installation
from the outside or over a distance. 
In Mordhurst’s view, with which I concur, it is this self-directed interaction
with the material presence that creates an experience of life more through
the senses than through the an abstract acknowledgement.[30]  She drew
her inspiration from geographer Johannes Gabriel Granö’s argument that if
a landscape is to be understood properly, it is “necessary to identify the
perceived landscape in its immediate incalculable presence (...),”[31] that
is, as a material life experienced and comprehended through the senses. 
Also, neither the Cradle nor the Wall offers any particular explanations for
the causes of the objects’ existence “but simply expose[s] the presence of
our composite medical consumption,”[32] or the presence, or the
existence of the abundance and complexity of sea life.
Gumbrecht sees this presence as an instance where a cultural
phenomenon becomes tangible, instantly impacting our body and senses
through its tangibleness.[33]  This is the dimension of presence and its
effects that, according to Gumbrecht, have been overlooked in the
humanities because of the emphasis given to the act of interpretation as
the means of knowledge production,[34] but I believe that his position and
reasoning are applicable to a wider field of human endeavors than the
humanities alone.  We are accustomed to expect depth from our
observations and from things we observe, that there is more than meets
the eye and that that information can be obtained through interpretation
penetrating the immediate, material presence of things.  It is this
conceptual information produced through interpretation, as opposed to the
immediate sensory reaction, that is here conceived as something having
depth or as something having conceptual meaning.  Generally, we have
come to value this dimension of meaning over the dimension of presence. 
As Gumbrecht wrote, we tend to attach positive value to this depth and
consider our immediate sensory reactions as superficial because they lack
the qualities that would give them depth.[35]
What if the Wall actually has no depth in the sense explained above?  If
interpretation is, as Gumbrecht put it, an act of looking beyond the
material surface of things to find the meaning beneath the material
actuality of the object,[36] and we are somewhat conditioned to seek
interpretation, would it not be confusing to find the Wall to be superficial,
with no hidden meaning to be discovered?  What if, after spending an
enthusiastic moment exploring the creatures of the Wall with aesthetic
preferences, I then referred to the conventions of natural history exhibition
literature and began to look for an intellectual meaning behind this
particular exhibit but found very little that is subject to interpretation?  If
the objective of a natural history exhibition is to communicate scientific
knowledge by utilizing specimens for their illustrative value and use the art
of exhibiting to entice interpretation, is the presence-effect of the Wall
counterproductive?  Does it not go against the scientific principles of
objective, distanced observation and reasoning based on quantifiability and
repeatability?
There is also another concern.  Traditionally, the visitor is the observer
looking interpretatively into the exhibit from his or her own separate
space.  The look is expected to be towards the exhibit; it does not seem
conceivable for the exhibit to look back.  In the case of the Wall, its
strength in numbers gave me the feeling that I was not looking at or
observing an exhibit but that I had come to a meeting with the
representatives of the oceanic world.  As I was looking at the creatures on
the wall, they looked back at me.  I was standing along or amongst them,
and the gap between us, the distance that is often associated with
intellectual, analytical objectivity, had somehow disappeared or at least
been reduced.  As this gap shrunk, my role as an active producer of
knowledge shrunk along with it.  The specimens had found their individual
voices.  It was as if the tiny turtles had themselves told me their short life
history and the same level of personality was present in every specimen. 
They confronted me as individuals, as members of species traveling on
their individual evolutionary roads, as a system of diversity.  I sensed a
glimpse of the interconnectedness and the changeability of the world. 
Gumbrecht described moments of presence like these as moments of
intensity, where the state of being-in-the-world suddenly appears to
us.[37]  In that intensity of presence, an intuitive comprehension of the
complexity of the world seems possible.
8.  Conclusion, or towards a reconnection of the aesthetic and the
scientific
The questions I posed at the beginning now seem to assume that the
artification of natural history exhibitions would somehow lead to a dilution
of visitors’ comprehension of science, and that the inclusion of the artistic
and aesthetic would somehow mislead visitors to place less significance on
accuracy, precision, objectivity and the scientific method in general.  How
can scientific laws founded on generalizations be formed if each scientific
specimen is to be treated as unique? The presence-effect of the Wall does
interfere with some of the principles of science, namely objective distance
and the direction of observation, but is this truly counterproductive, a “bad
thing”?  I would say not.
Could it be, in fact, that the artification of natural history exhibitions is on
some level a result of the efforts to reconnect the aesthetic and the
scientific?  In Foundations of Environmental Ethics, Hargrove described
how closely early natural history was linked with the arts and aesthetics,
especially through landscape painting during the nineteenth century.[38] 
Many natural historians were accomplished drawers (partly because of a
need to make visual records before cameras were available), and many
artists have had a trait of a naturalist in them, like Leonardo da Vinci, to
mention an obvious example.  The connection of artistic/aesthetic does not
end with a scientist’s ability to draw but extends much deeper, as
demonstrated by Welsch’s epistemological aestheticization.  As he wrote: 
“[A]n awareness of cognition’s and reality’s foundational aesthetic
character is currently permeating all academic disciplines,”[39] and the
Wall and the Cradle show how the public reconnection of science and
aesthetics can be possible. 
Another related issue is the ongoing discussion on the similarities between
artistic and scientific practices.  Gumbrecht addressed this by suggesting
that “aesthetic experience” as a concept should be extended, and by
describing it as an oscillation between “present effects” and “meaning
effects.”[40]  In Artscience – Creativity in the Post-Google Generation,
David Edwards offered descriptions of how this oscillation can be seen in
the work of individual scientist/artists, such as ethnomusicologist Kay
Kaufman Shelemay and cell biologist Don Ingber, who utilize both science
and art in their practices.  Through his narrative it becomes apparent how
significant a role this artistry plays.  
This suggests that perhaps natural history exhibitions have at one point
begun to put too much effort on interpretation, which has led to the
undermining of the presence and being-in-the-world to which Gumbrecht
linked his concept.  This has perhaps not been an acute issue until
recently, but now ecology and environmental studies have made it evident
that we can no longer hold on to an approach that places us as observers
outside the world.  The interconnectedness and unstable, fluctuating
nature of the world are becoming more recognized.  One way in which this
can be seen manifesting itself is the museum visitors’ tendency to seek
experiences of connectedness.  It has become necessary to represent this
interdependency and to give the visitors an actual bodily feeling that we
are in the world together.  Artification  appears as a necessary strategy,
for through it the notions that are difficult to communicate in the language
of science can be expressed in the language of art.
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